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VIRGINIA'S MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
In 1977, Virginia's Medical Malpractice Act1 became effective. The
Virginia Supreme Court has since convened numerous panels for prelimi-
nary review of malpractice claims which alleged victims otherwise would
have filed directly in court.2 The Virginia Act provides that an individual
may not file a medical malpractice action in court without first giving
written notice of the claim to the health care provider defendant.s The
written notice will automatically stay the filing of suit for ninety days.
4
Within sixty days of claimant's notice, either party may request the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court to select a panel to review the claim.5 Upon the re-
quest of claimant or health care provider, the review panel will conduct a
hearing on the merits of the claim.' The panel must send its written opin-
ion on the issue of liability to both parties7 within five days of the conclu-
VA. CODE §§ 8.01-581.1 to 8.01-581.20 (1977 & Supp. 1980).
2 Virginia Supreme Court, Executive Secretary, Medical Malpractice Review Panel
Statistics, Dec. 31, 1979 [hereinafter cited as Review Panel Statistics]; see text accompany-
ing notes 3-9 infra. As of December 31, 1979, the Virginia Supreme Court had convened a
total of 266 medical malpractice review panels. Id.
' VA. CODE § 8.01-581.2 (1977). The claimant's notice to the health care provider of a
medical malpractice claim must reasonably describe the alleged act of malpractice and spec-
ify when it occurred. Id. Neither the claimant nor the health care provider may bring suit in
court on the malpractice claim within ninety days of the date of notice. Id. But see note 5
infra. Notice is given as of the time the claimant mails a notification to the health care
provider. Virginia Supreme Court, Medical Malpractice Rules of Practice, rule 2(a), Aug. 6,
1979 (revised rules effective August 15, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Rules of Practice]. A
"health care provider" is any person, corporation, facility or institution licensed to provide
health care services in Virginia. VA. CODE § 8.01-581.1.1 (1977).
4 VA. CODE § 8.01-581.2 (1977).
5 Id. The Chief Justice of the Virginia Supreme Court receives all requests for review of
malpractice claims, and selects a review panel. Id. Rules of Practice, supra note 3, rule 3(a).
Three attorneys, three health care providers, and a circuit judge acting as chairman com-
prise each panel. Rules of Practice, supra note 3, rule 3(a). If neither party requests a hear-
ing within 60 days of notice to the health care provider, the claimant may proceed directly
to court. See VA. CODE § 8.01-581.2 (1977).
6 VA. CODE § 8.01-581.5 (Supp. 1980). If one party requests review of the malpractice
claim but neither party requests a hearing, the panel will evaluate the merits of the claim on
the basis of documentary evidence submitted to it by the parties. Id. § 8.01-581.4.
In 1979, the Virginia legislature amended section* 8.01-581.5 to make a panel hearing
mandatory upon the request of either party. See id. § 8.01-581.5. The original statute pro-
vided that, when a party requested a hearing, the review panel had discretion to either grant
the hearing or deny it and issue an opinion based on documentary evidence alone. See VA.
CODE § 8.01-581.5 (1977).
' VA. CODE § 8.01-581.6.5 (Supp. 1980). The review panel may recommend: (1) no liabil-
ity on the part of the health care provider; (2) liability for failure to comply with the appro-
priate standard of care; (3) that the health care provider's negligence was not the proximate
cause of claimant's injury; or (4) that the claim involves an issue of fact for determination
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sion of the hearing.8 A claimant or health care provider who is dissatisfied
with the panel's decision may file suit in court within sixty days of issu-
ance of the opinion.9 In a subsequent trial, the panel's opinion is admissi-
ble in evidence but is not conclusive on the issue of liability.10 While the
Virginia Medical Malpractice Act has not yet been challenged, case law
from other states indicates that the statute may be subject to attack on
constitutional grounds.
A number of state courts have addressed the issue of whether medical
malpractice review legislation similar to the Virginia Act infringes upon
rights guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions.11 Malpractice
claimants have challenged the review panels on three separate grounds.
First, claimants have alleged that establishment of the panel review pro-
cedure violates the constitutional separation of powers principle by dele-
gating judicial functions to non-judicial officers.12 Secondly, claimants
have argued that a statutorily required hearing before filing suit in court
denies malpractice victims equal protection of the laws. s Finally, the
panel hearings allegedly deny due process rights by obstructing claimants'
constitutional right of access to the courts14 and invading the province of
by a trier of fact. VA. CODE §§ 8.01-581.7.1--8.01-581.7.4 (1977); see text accompanying
notes 48-49 infra. The panel must issue its opinion within 30 days of receipt of all the
evidence. VA. CODE § 8.01-581.7 (1977).
a VA. CODE § 8.01-581.7.C (1977).
9 Id. § 8.01-581.9 (1977). In the event that there is no hearing, the claimant may take
advantage of an alternative statute of limitations, bringing suit within 120 days of the
oroginal notice to the health care provider. Id. But see note 3 supra.
'0 VA. CODE § 8.01-581.8 (Supp. 1980); see text accompanying notes 86-87 infra. Either
party may call any panel member except the chairman to testify at trial. VA. CODE § 8.01-
581.8 (Supp. 1980); see note 16 infra. Virginia's Medical Malpractice Act does not limit the
scope of a panel member's examination. See VA. CODE § 8.01-581.8 (Supp. 1980); text ac-
companying note 89 infra.
" See Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744, 748 (1977); Wright v. Cent. Du
Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 IlI.2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736, 741 (1976); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp.,
Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585, 589 (Ind. 1980); Everett v. Goldman, 359 So.2d 1256, 1265-67 (La.
1978); Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57, 65-77 (1978); Paro v. Longwood
Hosp., - Mass. -, 369 N.E.2d 985, 989-91 (1977); State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Memo-
rial Hosp. v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Mo. 1979); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97,
256 N.W.2d 657, 663-67 (1977); Parker v. Children's Hosp., 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932, 938-
44 (1978); State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis.2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434, 444-46 (1978).
"I See Wright v. Cent. Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 l.2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736, 739 (1976);
Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657, 667 (1977); Parker v. Children's Hosp.,
483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932, 943 (1978); State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis.2d 491, 261
N.W.2d 434, 439 (1978); text accompanying notes 22-34 infra.
13 See Everett v. Goldman, 357 So.2d 1256, 1266 (La. 1978); Attorney Gen. v. Johnson,
282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57, 78-79 (1978); Paro v. Longwood Hosp., - Mass. _, 369 N.E.2d
985, 989 (1977); Harrison v. Schrader, 569 S.W.2d 822, 825-26 (Tenn. 1978); State ex reL
Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis.2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434, 439 (1978); text accompanying notes
35-66 infra.
" See Everett v. Goldman, 359 So.2d 1256, 1269 (La. 1978); Paro v. Longwood Hosp.,
- Mass. - 369 N.E.2d 985, 991 (1977); Harrison v. Schrader, 569 S.W.2d 822, 827 (Tenn.
1978); State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis.2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434, 439 (1978); text
accompanying notes 67-90 infra.
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the jury so as effectively to deny claimants' right to jury trial.1"
Claimants first successfully challenged the constitutionality of a medi-
cal malpractice statute in a 1976 Illinois suit, Wright v. Central Du Page
Hospital Association.'6 The Supreme Court of Illinois held that legisla-
tion requiring submission of claims to a review panel prior to filing suit in
court was constitutionally unsound for three reasons. The Wright court
found that the Act improperly vested an administrative panel with pow-
ers reserved exclusively to the courts by the Illinois Constitution."7 The
court reasoned that proceedings before the panel were adversary in na-
ture"8 and that the statute permitted physician and attorney panel mem-
bers to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. 9 In addition, the
16 See Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744, 747 (1977); Wright v. Cent. Du
Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill.2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736, 739 (1976); Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282
Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57, 70-71 (1978); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657,
665 (1977); Parker v. Children's Hosp., 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932, 938-39 (1978); text accom-
panying notes 83-90 infra
16 63 Ill.2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976). Claimants have successfully challenged the con-
stitutionality of medical malpractice review legislation in only three states-Missouri, Ohio
and Illinois. The Missouri Supreme Court recently held the Missouri statute unconstitu-
tional on the ground that the review procedure denied malpractice claimants their right of
access to the courts. State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hosp. v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d
107, 110 (Mo. 1979). As the sole support for its holding the majority analogized to an Illinois
statute, requiring pretrial "arbitration" of intra-family disputes in order to lower the divorce
rate, which the Illinois Supreme Court had held to deny access to the courts. Id. at 110; see
People ex rel. Christiansen v. Connell, 2 Ill.2d 332, 118 N.E.2d 262 (1954). The Gaertner
majority found the reasoning in Christiansen "persuasive." 583 S.W.2d at 110. Judge Sime-
one, concurring in Gaertner, added that the statute's requirement that a judge sit on the
panel was inconsistent with the Missouri Constitution's separation of powers principle. Id.
at 111. Chief Justice Morgan strongly dissented in favor of sustaining the statute's constitu-
tionality. See id. at 112-17.
Virginia's Act similarly provides that a circuit judge will be the panel chairman. VA.
CODE § 8.01-581.3 (1977). In Virginia, however, the judge cannot vote except to break a tie.
Id. The supervisory nature of the judge's duties appears to be the reason that the legislature
amended the Act to provide that the panel chairman cannot be called as a witness in a
subsequent trial. See VA. CODE=§ 8.01-581.8 (Supp. 1980).
In 1976, the Ohio court of common pleas invalidated legislation requiring preliminary
review of medical malpractice claims. Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op.3d
164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (1976). The court held that statutory provisions for compulsory arbitra-
tion and a ceiling on damages unfairly discriminated against medical malpractice victims
constituting a denial of equal protection. 355 N.E.2d at 906. Additionally, the court held
that the review procedure effectively denied the claimant a jury trial by imposing upon him
the additional expense of trying his case to both panel and jury, and the additional burden
of rebutting an adverse panel finding at trial. Id. at 907-08. The Ohio court's opinion does
not, however, offer any compelling reasoning in support of its conclusions.
The supreme courts of Arizona, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Nebraska, New York,
Tennessee and Wisconsin have sustained medical malpractice review legislation against con-
stitutional challenge. See note 11 supra.
17 347 N.E.2d at 739-40.
Is ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 58.b(2) (Supp. 1979)(Smith-Hurd). The Illinois legislature
repealed section 58.b effective August 28, 1979. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 58.2 (Supp.
1980) (Smith-Hurd).
19 347 N.E.2d at 736.
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court found that the statutory provision requiring a hearing before a
claimant could file his complaint in court abrogated the claimant's right
to a jury trial.2" Finally, the court determined that the statute denied
medical malpractice victims equal protection of the laws by placing a
$500,000 ceiling on recoverable damages without creating a remedy to
substitute for the limitation on a tort claimant's right of recovery at com-
mon law.21 Since Virginia's Medical Malpractice Act is substantively simi-
lar to the Illinois statute, a claimant challenging the Virginia Act is likely
to make the same separation of powers, equal protection, and due process
arguments addressed in Wright.
A claimant is likely to challenge the Virginia Act on the ground that it
vests judicial powers and duties in an administrative panel,22 whereas the
Constitution of Virginia vests the judicial power of the Commonwealth
exclusively in the courts.23 Under the Virginia Act, three lawyers, three
doctors and a circuit judge compose a review panel and make findings on
the ultimate issue in the case, the health care provider's liability.24 Unlike
the Illinois statute invalidated in Wright, however, the Virginia Act does
not permit a panel decision to bind the parties on any question of fact, or
on the ultimate issue of liability, under any circumstances.25 In Illinois,
the decision of a review panel became binding if both claimant and health
care provider agreed to accept the panel's conclusion. 28 A court could
then enter judgment on the basis of the panel opinion alone, without fur-
ther adjudication of the merits of the claim.
27
The opinion rendered by a review panel under the Virginia Act is only
a recommendation and not a conclusive determination of the health care
provider's liability.28 A panel recommendation is always subject to a con-
trary finding on the issue of liability by the trier of fact in a court of
law.29 While the recommendation is admissible in evidence at a subse-
20 Id. at 741.
21 Id. at 743.
2 See text accompanying notes 12, 18-19 supra.
22 VA. CONST. art. III, § 1. According to the separation of powers principle, the judici-
ary's function is to interpret the laws. Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Cape Charles, 144 Va. 56,
63, 131 S.E.2d 437, 439 (1926).
24 VA. CoDE § 8.01-581.3 (1977); see note 16 supra.
VA. CODE § 8.01-581.8 (Supp. 1980); see VA. CODE § 8.01-581.7 (1977).
6 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 58.8(1) (Supp. 1979) (Smith-Hurd), repealed 1979, see note
18 supra.
27 See id.; 347 N.E.2d at 736.
18 VA. CODE § 8.01-581.8 (Supp. 1979).
29 See id. Either party may reject a panel opinion and proceed to trial. Id. Although a
review panel can apply legal principles to facts and render an opinion, the legislature has
not vested in the panel the judicial power which would make that opinion binding and en-
forceable against claimant or health care provider, and thus has not violated the separation
of powers principle. See Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57, 65 (1978);
Comment, Constitutional Challenges to Medical Malpractice Review Boards, 46 TENN. L.
Rav. 607, 632 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Constitutional Challenges]; note 21 supra. The
panel only makes a recommendation as to liability and has no authority to award damages
to a claimant. See generally VA. CODE §§ 8.01-581.11--8.01-581.20 (1977 & Supp. 1980).
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quent trial,30 it has no greater weight than expert testimony so that the
trier of fact is, theoretically, free to reach a contrary result.3 1 In theory, a
proper jury instruction will prevent the jury from giving undue weight to
a panel opinion so that the jury will not function passively as a "rubber
stamp" validating the panel's decision.3 2 Under the Medical Malpractice
Act, the Virginia Legislature has vested only "quasi-judicial" authority in
an administrative panel.3 8 Virginia's Constitution does not forbid the lim-
ited delegation of power to non-judicial officers because the findings and
conclusions made by the panel are always subject to review and reversal
in court.3 Since the opinion of a review panel cannot bind the parties to a
medical malpractice claim, a Virginia court will probably find, contrary to
the Illinois Supreme Court, that the potential separation of powers prob-
lem does not render the Virginia Act unconstitutional.
3 5
Even if the Act is valid under the separation of powers clause, medical
malpractice claimants may argue that the statute operates to deny them
equal protection of the laws in violation of the Virginia Constitution.6
Claimants' equal protection argument rests on two theories. First, the Act
identifies and regulates a single group of tort claimants.3 7 Out of all tort
victims, medical malpractice claimants alone may not proceed to court,
once either party has filed a request for a hearing, until after the review
Even the claimant who receives a favorable recommendation from the panel must bring an
action in court to recover damages.
30 See text accompanying note 10 supra.
' See notes 61 & 87 infra.
s See text accompanying notes 84-87 infra. The medical malpractice claimant may ar-
gue that the danger of a jury's bias in favor of the party successful before the panel is so
great that admission of the opinion in evidence effectively denies claimant a jury trial. See
State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis.2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434, 451 (1978); Comiskey v.
Arlen, 55 App.Div.2d 304, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122, 125 (1976).
33 See Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57, 63 (1978); State ex rel.
Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis.2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434, 448-49 (1978).
"See text accompanying note 72 infra. There are valid grounds on which to hold the
Virginia Act consistent with the separation of powers, despite the suggestion of an early
commentator that a statute permitting administrators to decide questions of law and fact on
the merits of a malpractice claim was unconstitutional. See Constitutional Challenge, supra
note 29, at 632; Harlan, Virginia's New Medical Malpractice Review Panel and Some Ques-
tions it Raises, 11 U. RiCH. L. RaV. 51, 59 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Harlan]; text accom-
panying notes 25-34 supra.
35 Judge Simeone, concurring in State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hosp. v.
Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1979), recognized that the Missouri Act's requirement that a
circuit judge sit on a review panel raised a separation of powers issue. 583 S.W.2d at 111; see
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.025.1 (Supp. 1980) (Vernon). The Virginia Act similarly provides that
a circuit judge shall be a panel member and gives the judge power to cast a tie breaking
vote. VA. CODE § 8.01-581.3 (1977). The crucial question for a Virginia court would appear to
be whether the judge who casts a vote to break a tie is merely acting in a procedural capac-
ity, or is performing "non-judicial" functions in violation of the separation of powers clause.
See note 23 supra.
36 VA. CONST. art. I, § 11; see text accompanying note 13 supra.
37 See VA. CODE § 8.01-581.2 (1977); Rules of Practice, supra note 3, rule 2(a).
[Vol. XXXVII
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACT
board has issued its opinion." Secondly, the Act establishes a $750,000
ceiling on damages recoverable by a medical malpractice victim,39 which
allegedly discriminates against seriously injured claimants while favoring
those less seriously injured.
4 0
To determine whether a statute denies equal protection to a class of
persons courts apply either a "strict scrutiny" or a "rational basis" test.
4 '1
The strict scrutiny test is applicable to legislation which regulates the
exercise of a fundamental right 2 or singles out a "suspect" class of per-
sons for special treatment..4  Those courts which have decided the ques-
tion uniformly held that legislation regulating the procedure by which a
medical malpractice claimant brings his case to court involves neither a
fundamental right nor a suspect classification.44 Thus, a Virginia court
would properly apply the rational basis test if faced with an equal protec-
tion challenge to the Act.
Where a plaintiff questions the validity of a statute, the rationale ba-
sis test raises a presumption of the statute's constitutionality.45 Absent a
showing that the allegedly discriminatory statutory classification is not
reasonably related to a legitimate state interest, a court must sustain the
statute.4 6 Whether the Virginia Act bears a reasonable relation to a valid
38 See VA. CODE § 8.01-581.2 (1977).
:9 Id. § 8.01-581.15.
,0 See Seoane v. Ortho Pharmaceuticals, 472 F. Supp. 468, 470 (E.D. La. 1979); Simon
v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op.3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903, 906 (1976).
41 Harrison v. Schrader, 569 S.W.2d 822, 825 (Tenn. 1978); see Woods v. Holy Cross
Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1172-73 (5th Cir. 1979).
42 Harrison v. Schrader, 569 S.W.2d 822, 825 (Tenn. 1978). The federal and state con-
stitutions afford special protection to fundamental rights, such as the right to vote and the
right to travel. 569 S.W.2d at 825.
43 Harrison v. Schrader, 569 S.W.2d 822, 825 (Tenn. 1978). A "suspect" classification is
based on race, religion, alienage or a similar grouping. Id.; see note 46 infra. See generally
Comment, Compelling State Interest Test and the Equal Protection Clause-An Analysis,
6 CuM. L. REv. 109 (1975).
" Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1173 (5th Cir. 1979); Seoane v. Ortho
Pharmaceuticals, 472 F. Supp. 468, 472 (E.D. La. 1979); Comiskey v. Arlen, 55 App.Div.2d
304, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122, 129-30 (1976).
4' Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So.2d 802, 805 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041
(1977); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657, 672 (1977); Harrison v. Schra-
der, 569 S.W.2d 822, 825 (Tenn. 1978); State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis.2d 491,
261 N.W.2d 434, 441 (1978); see Aldana v. Holub, 381 So.2d 231, 237 (Fla. 1980).
41 State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis.2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434, 441 (1978). The
state's burden of proof to sustain a statute is much less when the legislation involves no
fundamental right or suspect classification. See id. An Ohio court erroneously applied the
strict scrutiny test to medical malpractice legislation in Graley v. Satayatham, 74 Ohio 2d
316, 343 N.E.2d 832, 837-38 (1976), holding that proponents of the statute had failed to
show a "compelling governmental interest" justifying the unequal treatment of specially
classified medical malpractice victims. Id. The Graley court found that the Ohio statute's
special treatment of medical malpractice victims was unrelated to the promotion of public
health, so that the statutory classification furthered no legitimate legislative objective. Id. at
836, 838. Under the strict scrutiny test, challenged legislation is not sustainable unless the
party defending the statute shows a compelling state interest justifying regulation of the
19801, 1197
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state interest depends upon the legislature's objective in enacting the
statute. Virginia's legislature passed the Medical Malpractice Act to en-
courage extrajudicial resolution of medical malpractice claims and to pre-
vent frivolous claims from crowding court dockets.47 As of December 31,
1979, 122 Virginia panels had completed review of a malpractice claim
and issued a written opinion.4 Ninety-six panels decided in favor of the
defending health care provider, finding no liability, while seventeen ruled
in favor of the claimant.4 9 Based on these figures, panel decisions appear
to favor the health care provider heavily. One possible explanation for the
results of the hearings is panel members' bias toward health care provid-
ers."0 An alternative explanation is that many of the claims which come
before malpractice review panels are in fact frivolous, and ought not to go
to trial.5 1
If the pre-trial hearing procedure operates to decrease the number of
medical malpractice cases going to court, either by deterring frivolous
claims or by encouraging extra-judicial settlement, Virginia insurers can
afford to lower the rates charged health care providers for malpractice
exercise of a fundamental right, or of the suspect class. See id. The strict scrutiny test is
inapplicable; however, where a statute involving no fundamental right or suspect classifica-
tion is challenged on equal protection grounds. See text accompanying note 44 supra; notes
42 & 43 supra. Subsequently, a second Ohio court relied exclusively on the faulty reasoning
in Graley as the basis for sustaining an equal protection challenge to another provision of
the Ohio statute. See Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op.3d 164, 355 N.E.2d
903, 906 (1976); note 16 supra.
47 Cf. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301-102 (Supp. 1980-81) (Purdon) (purpose of Penn-
sylvania medical malpractice act to make malpractice insurance available at reasonable cost
and to enable prompt determination of malpractice victim's rights). See generally Review
Panel Statistics, supra note 2. During the "malpractice crisis" of the 1970's, the number of
medical malpractice cases rose steadily, driving malpractice insurance rates up. Doctors and
hospitals passed the increased cost of insurance on to the public, charging more for their
services. State legislatures feared that the trend would make health care practically unavail-
able to persons of low income. See Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657, 662
(1977); Abrams v. Brooklyn Hosp., 91 Misc.2d 380, 398 N.Y.S.2d 114, 115 (1977); Parker v.
Children's Hosp., 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932, 936 (1978); Note, Alternatives to the Medical
Malpractice Phenomenon: Damage Limitations, Malpractice Review Panels and Counter-
suits, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1179, 1186-87 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Alternatives];
Harlan, supra note 34 at 54-55; Margolick, Mediation Isn't Cure For Patients' Claims, NAT.
L.J., Feb. 4, 1980, at 1 , col. 2-3 [hereinafter cited as Mediation Isn't Cure].
48 Review Panel Statistics, supra note 2; see text accompanying note 2 supra.
4' Review Panel Statistics, supra note 2. Of the 122 panels having completed review of
a claim by December 31, 1979, four found that the health care provider's negligence was not
the proximate cause of claimant's injuries, and five decided that there existed a material
issue of fact properly determinable by a jury. Id.; see note 7 supra. In 60 of the 266 total
cases submitted to review panels in Virginia, malpractice claimants either settled with the
health care provider prior to trial or voluntarily withdrew their claims, so that the panels
never issued an opinion as to liability. Review Panel Statistics, supra note 2. In fifteen
cases, review panels were dismissed, enabling claimants with clearly meritorious cases to file
suit directly in court. Id.
" See text accompanying note 24 supra; text accompanying notes 84-85 infra.
8" See text accompanying note 47 supra; text accompanying note 52 infra.
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insurance.52 As a result, health care providers can afford to make health
care readily available to the public at reasonable cost by lowering their
own rates.53 When necessary to effect a valid public purpose, the legisla-
ture may place a burden upon persons seeking to enter the courts without
infringing upon constitutional rights." Thus, a challenger to the Virginia
Act will shoulder the substantial burden of showing that the statute is
not related to the compelling public purpose of providing lower cost
health care in Virginia.
s5
The hypothetical claimant's second equal protection argument is
founded upon the Act's limitation on damages recoverable at common
law. A statutory limit on damages induces medical malpractice insurers
to lower their insurance rates, and theoretically, the cost of health care
correspondingly decreases.5 7 The limitation on recovery may, however,
"2While insurers can afford to lower their medical malpractice insurance rates as the
threat of many lawsuits and large recoveries decreases, there is no guarantee that they will
do so. State legislatures appear, however, to have faith that competition between insurers
will drive rates down and thus effectuate the purposes behind medical malpractice legisla-
tion. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.102 (Supp. 1979-80) (Purdon).
One way in which the pre-trial review procedure may encourage settlement of claims is
by imposing prohibitive extra expenses upon claimants. See note 73 infra.
6' Constitutional Challenges, supra note 29, at 631; Note, Delegation of Judicial Func-
tions to Nonjudicial Medical Review Panel Held Violative of State Constitution, 1977
B.Y.U. L. REv. 189, 207 n.91 [hereinafter cited as Delegation of Judicial Functions].
64Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. 566, 574 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Note, The Consti-
tutional Considerations of Medical Malpractice Screening Panels, 27 AM. U. L. REv. 161,
170 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Constitutional Considerations]; see note 49 supra. The su-
preme courts of Maryland, Louisiana, Wisconsin, Nebraska and New York have found a
reasonable relation between state medical malpractice statutes and state legislatures' public
purpose of decreasing the cost of health care. See Everett v. Goldman, 359 So.2d 1256, 1266
(La. 1978); Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57, 78-79 (1978); Prendergast v.
Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657, 667-68 (1977); Comiskey v. Arlen, 55 App.Div.2d 304,
390 N.Y.S.2d 122, 129-30 (1976); State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis.2d 491, 261
N.W.2d 434, 443 (1978); accord Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 59 F.2d 1164, 1175 (5th Cir.
1979); text accompanying notes 47 & 52 supra.
5' See Seoane v. Ortho Pharmaceuticals, 472 F. Supp. 468, 472 (E.D. La. 1979) (claim-
ant failed to show medical malpractice statute an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of
legislative authority); Paro v. Longwood Hosp., - Mass. _, 369 N.E.2d 985, 988 (1977)
(claimant failed to sustain "onerous" burden of showing no rational relation between medi-
cal malpractice legislation and public purpose of decreasing health care costs); Comiskey v.
Arlen, 55 App.Div.2d 304, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122, 128 (1976) (claimant showed no rational basis
for statutory classification).
See Wright v. Cent. Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 IMI. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736, 741 (1976);
Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657, 669 (1977). At common law, a tort
victim could recover reasonable compensation for his losi. Comment, A Constitutional Per-
spective on the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act, 51 IND. L.J. 143, 148-49 (1975) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Constitutional Perspective].
'" See notes 47 & 52 supra; text accompanying note 52 supra. With Virginia's Medical
Malpractice Act in effect, a malpractice victim cannot recover more than $750,000 on his
claim. VA. CODE § 8.01-581.15 (1977). Insurers therefore need not protect themselves against
multi-million dollar recoveries by charging doctors and hospitals high insurance premiums.
The Act also may operate to save insurers the costs and fees incurred litigating frivolous
claims, and the expense of paying out numerous small recoveries. See text accompanying
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prevent the seriously injured malpractice victim from receiving full com-
pensation for his loss.
Traditionally, the legislature may not statutorily alter a common law
right without substituting an equivalent remedy.55 Courts have indicated
that, since the public purpose behind medical malpractice review statutes
is so compelling, the legislature probably can alter common law rights of
recovery without providing a reasonable substitute. 9 At least two courts
have held, however, that the benefits available to both the individual
claimant and the general public under medical malpractice legislation are
themselves an adequate substitute for the limitation on claimants' com-
mon law recovery of damages.6 0 The statutes ensure that the claimant will
have a fund out of which to collect a judgment and an expert opinion on
the merits of the case,6 1 and benefit society by encouraging expeditious
resolution of medical malpractice claims.6 2 Only the Illinois Supreme
Court has reached a contrary result, holding in Wright that the potential
benefits of the Illinois statute, lowered insurance premiums and health
care costs, were an "insufficient substitute" for the statutory modification
of common law recovery, and that a limit on recoverable damages was
therefore an appropriate reason for invalidating the statute.6 3 At least
three state medical malpractice statutes place an upper limit on the
note 52 supra.
88 The "reasonable substitute" test requires that the state supply equivalent rights or
benefits to the class of persons affected by the legislature's abrogation of common law rights.
Constitutional Perspective, supra note 56, at 150.
59 See Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57, 62 (1978) (neither federal
nor state constitutions forbid abrogation of common law rights and creation of new rights);
Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657, 671 (1977) (dicta that no reasonable
substitute necessary for legislature to alter common law right); Comiskey v. Arlen, 55
App.Div.2d 304, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122, 125-26 (1976) (persons have no vested interest in com-
mon law rules).
60 Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657, 671 (1977); Comiskey v. Arlen,
55 App.Div.2d 304, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122, 126 (1976); see Alternatives, supra note 47, at 1183;
Delegation of "judicial Functions, supra note 53, at 209. But see Wright v. Cent. Du Page
Hosp. Ass'n, 63 IlM. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736, 742 (1976) (lower insurance premiums and medi-
cal care costs an insufficient substitute for statutory limitation on damages recoverable by
seriously injured medical malpractice victims).
61 Everett v. Goldman, 359 So.2d 1256, 1267 (La. 1978); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199
Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657, 671 (1977); Parker v. Children's Hosp., 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932,
939 (1978). Claimants successfully argued before the Illinois Supreme Court that a patients'
compensation fund and an opinion by a panel of "experts" were not a reasonable substitute
for the restrictions imposed by medical malpractice legislation. Wright v. Cent. Du Page
Hosp. Ass'n, 63 I1.2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736, 742 (1976).
62 See text accompanying notes 47-51 supra.
" 347 N.E.2d at 742. The Wright court distinguished the Illinois medical malpractice
statute from the Workmen's Compensation Act, reasoning that the latter, by imposing equal
burdens and benefits on both employer and employee, provided a reasonable substitute for
the limitations placed on an employee's recovery at common law. Id. at 742. The court was
not convinced, however, that the medical malpractice statute would in fact benefit claimants
by decreasing insurance premiums and thus lowering the cost of medical care. See id.
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amount of damages recoverable by the claimant." Virginia's $750,000
limit allows a substantially greater recovery than the $500,000 ceiling im-
posed by statutes of other states.6 5 Furthermore, one commentator indi-
cates that few medical malpractice claimants in Virginia have suffered
such serious injury that reasonable compensation would exceed the statu-
tory limit.66 Despite the Virginia Act's classification of medical malprac-
tice victims for special treatment, its public purpose compensates for the
burden which it imposes upon claimants. Thus, Virginia courts have a
sound basis on which to deny an equal protection challenge.
Finally, claimants may challenge the constitutionality of the Virginia
Act on the grounds that it operates to delay access to the courts and pre-
vent a fair jury trial, thus denying due process of law in violation of the
Virginia Constitution.6 7 Although the seventh amendment right to a jury
trial is not applicable to the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment,68 Virginia has preserved that right and the right
of access to the courts in its Constitution. 9
Whether legislation requiring review of all medical malpractice claims
prior to trial effectively denies claimants their constitutional rights of ac-
cess to the courts and trial by jury may depend upon whether a court
construes the statute to create a trial substitute or merely to establish a
pre-trial proceeding.70 Virginia's Medical Malpractice Act does not ex-
pressly state that either party has the right to a full adjudication on the
merits of a claim before the trier of fact, following a hearing. The Act
does, however, establish a special statute of limitations for medical mal-
practice claims71 and provide that a panel opinion will be admissible in
evidence at a subsequent trial.72 Apparently, the legislature did not in-
tend the Act to substitute for a jury trial, but meant instead that the
review procedure would operate similarly to a pretrial conference by en-
couraging settlement of claims prior to trial.
ILL. Rv. STAT. ch. 70, § 101 (Supp. 1979) (Smith-Hurd), repealed 1979, see note 18
supra, ($500,000 ceiling); NEB. Rv. STAT. § 44-2825 (Supp. 1978) ($500,000 ceiling); VA.
CODE § 8.01-581.15 (1977) ($750,000 ceiling). Other statutes prohibit any demand for a spe-
cific sum by the claimant. See, e.g., ARiz. Rv. STAT. § 12-566 (Supp. 1979); HAW. Rpv. STAT.
§ 671-4 (1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60C (Supp. 1979).
VA. CODE § 8.01-581.15 (1977); see note 60 supra.
" See Alternatives, supra note 47, at 1185-86. Arguably, if the Virginia Act's $750,000
ceiling on recoverable damages denies equal protection to a single claimant with damages
exceeding that amount, grounds for a constitutional challenge exist.
67 See VA. CoNsT. art. I, § 11; text accompanying notes 14-15 supra.
"Minn. & St. Louis R.&. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916); Woods v. Holy Cross
Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1171 n.12 (5th Cir. 1979).
"VA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
' See State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Mem. Hosp. v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107, 113
(Mo. 1979); Constitutional Considerations, supra note 54, at 176-79.
71 VA. CODE § 8.01-581.9 (1977), provides that the claimant may pursue his claim within
120 days from the time of notice to the health care provider, or within 60 days of the date a
panel issues its opinion, whichever is later.
72 VA. CODE § 8.01-581.8 (Supp. 1980).
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If the parties do not settle a malpractice claim during the pre-trial
proceedings, the claimant must take his case to court in order to recover
damages. The hearing both delays the claimant in taking his case to court
and imposes upon him double costs for expert witness' and attorney's
fees. 78 For a claimant of limited means the burden will be substantial.
73 It is not in the claimant's interest to request review of his claim before a panel and
assume the extra expense of a hearing, unless he hopes to force a quick settlement. How-
ever, it will often be to the health care provider's advantage to apply for a hearing either to
discourage the claimant bringing a frivolous action, or to settle a meritorious claim. The
hearing nevertheless imposes some financial burden on the health care provider, as well as
on the claimant. See VA. CODE § 8.01-581.10 (1977); Rules of Practice, supra note 3, rule
4(c), (d). A health care provider faced with a clearly valid claim may be willing to let the
case go directly to trial to save time and expense, especially where claimant's recovery is
limited to $750,000. See VA. CODE § 8.01-581.15 (1977).
The claimant's alternative to paying twice in order to get his case to trial is to find an
attorney who will handle the claim on a contingent fee basis. An attorney is likely to take a
strong case for a contingent fee. Conversely, if claimant's case is weak and his attorney
refuses a contingent fee, the doubled financial burden may prevent claimant from going to
court following a hearing. This result may be consistent with legislative intent to keep frivo-
lous claims out of court. See text accompanying note 47 supra. However, the claimant with
limited financial resources whose attorney estimates only a forty percent chance of success
on the claim, and therefore refuses to take the case for a contingent fee, may be unable to go
to court although his claim is not frivolous.
In Virginia, claimant and health care provider bear all daily expenses incurred by the
seven panel members, but the chairman may distribute those costs between them in his
discretion. VA. CODE § 8.01-581.10 (1977); see Rules of Practice, supra note 7, rule 4(c), (d).
The claimant will generally want to present all relevant evidence to the panel in order to
obtain a favorable opinion, but his financial resources may be limited. The claimant who is
successful before the panel must go to court to recover from the health care provider be-
cause the panel has no authority to award damages. See VA. CODE § 8.01-581.7 (1977); VA.
CODE § 8.01-581.8 (Supp. 1980). Even though the claimant has a meritorious claim, he may
not be able to bear double expenses of expert witness' and attorney's fees. See Carter v.
Sparkman, 335 So.2d 802, 807-08 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977) (England,
J., concurring); Constitutional Considerations, supra note 51, at 167; Harlan, supra note 30,
at 55; Mediation Isn't Cure, supra note 44, at 34, col. 2.
In Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So.2d 802 (Fla. 1976), claimant argued that the expense and
delay caused by the pretrial hearing procedure resulted in a denial of her right of access to
the courts. 335 So.2d at 804. The Florida Supreme Court rejected the argument and sus-
tained the statute, but recognized that the extra burden imposed upon a claimant by the
required hearing "reaches the outer limits of constitutional tolerance." Id. at 806. The Flor-
ida Supreme Court recently held that, while the Florida Act had appeared constitutional on
its face, the statute had operated in an arbitrary and capricious manner which rendered it
unconstitutional. Aldana v. Holub, 381 So.2d 231, 237-38 (Fla. 1980). The court found that
the automatic lapse of a review panel's jurisdiction over parties to a medical malpractice
claim, ten months after submission of the claim, operated to deny the requesting party's due
process "right to mediation." Id. at 237. The court held, however, that to extend the juris-
dictional time limit would defeat the legislature's plan for an inexpensive summary proce-
dure and deny the claimant's constitutional right of speedy access to the courts. Id. at 10-11;
see FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21. Numerous medical malpractice claims may result in a backlog of
scheduled hearings in a state where the pretrial review procedure is mandatory, preventing
the claimant from speedily taking his case to court. See Mediation Isn't Cure, supra note
47, at 34, col. 1-2. The Virginia Act may, however, be secure from attack since its hearing is
not mandatory and therefore fewer claims go before a panel. See VA. CODE § 8.01-581.2
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Case law authority indicates, however, that the extra financial burden is
not so severe as to preclude the claimant from bringing his case to court,
and thus holds that there is no indirect denial of a jury trial.
1 4
A number of state medical malpractice statutes provide that a hearing
before a review panel is a condition precedent to bringing an action in
court.7 5 State supreme courts have sustained the statutes against due pro-
cess attack on the grounds that, since claimant and health care provider
are free to file an action in court following the hearing, a mandatory re-
view procedure does not deprive the claimant of access to court or a jury
trial.76 Unlike other statutes, the Virginia Act provides that a hearing
before a liability review panel prior to trial is not mandatory." Within
sixty days of claimant's notice to the health care provider, either party
"may" fie a request for review. 8 If neither party files a timely request,
the claimant may bring suit directly in the appropriate court.79 Thus, in
Virginia, not every medical malpractice claimant will necessarily have to
bear the inconvenience of delay and the doubled financial burden im-
posed by medical malpractice legislation."0
Those courts which have ruled on the validity of medical malpractice
legislation have consistently held that claimants have no constitutional
right to immediate access to court or to jury trial.81 If the legislature does
not deny the claimant's due process rights to notice and a fair hearing, it
may postpone access to the courts and a jury trial for a purpose reasona-
(1977); Review Panel Statistics, supra note 2.
74 Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F..d 1164, 1178-79 (5th Cir. 1979); Seoane v. Ortho
Pharmaceuticals, 472 F. Supp. 468, 473 (E.D. La. 1979); see Kimbrough v. Holiday -Inn, 478
F. Supp. 566, 570 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Paro v. Longwood Hosp., - Mass. -, 369 N.E.2d 985,
990-91 (1977).
7' See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. § 12-567A (Supp. 1957-79); LA. REv. STAT. ANN., §
40:1299.47A. (1977) (West); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 17-1304(1),(3) (Supp. 1977); NEv.
REv. STAT. § 41A.070 (1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-33-15.A. (Supp. 1976-77); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 40 § 1301.401 (Supp. 1979-80) (Purdon).
7' Seoane v. Ortho Pharmaceuticals, 472 F. Supp. 468, 473 (E.D. La. 1979); Everett v.
Goldman, 359 So.2d 1256, 1267 (La. 1978); Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d
57, 65 (1978). The Illinois Civil Practice Act provided that if both claimant and health care
provider accepted a panel's recommendation on the issue of liability, it would become bind-
ing upon them, so that a court could enter judgment on the basis of that opinion without
further adjudication. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 58.b(1) (Supp. 1979), repealed 1979, see note
18 supra. The Illinois Supreme Court found that the statute effectively denied a jury trial to
the claimant, overlooking the fact that a panel decision could not bind the parties in the
absence of unanimous agreement. Wright v. Cent. Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d at 740.
Virginia's Act includes no provision comparable to that held unconstitutional in Wright. See
Alternatives, supra note 47, at 1191.
77 VA. CODE § 8.01-581.2 (1977).
78 Id.; Rules of Practice, supra note 3, rule 2(c).
11 See note 71 supra; text accompanying note 73 supra.
80 See note 73 supra.
0' Everett v. Goldman, 359 So.2d 1256, 1266 (La. 1978); Comiskey v. Arlen, 55
App.Div.2d 304, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122, 125-26 (1976); see State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Mei.
Hosp. v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107, 114 (Mo. 1979) (Morgan, C.J., dissenting).
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bly related to a legitimate public need.
82
Claimants may further allege that admission of a panel opinion in evi-
dence at a subsequent trial denies them their constitutional right to a
jury trial on the merits of a medical malpractice claim. 3 Claimants chal-
lenging the constitutionality of medical malpractice legislation in other
states have argued that admission of the opinion is bound to influence the
jury to render an opinion consistent with that of the panel, and that the
parties are thus denied a trial before impartial fact finders." Courts
which have ruled on this question reject the contention that the panel's
recommendation as to the health care provider's liability will bias the
jury, and state that a proper jury instruction will enable the jury to make
an impartial finding on the basis of all the evidence adduced at trial.8 5
Virginia courts should reach a similar result. Admission of a panel opin-
ion in evidence does not prevent the jury from hearing all relevant evi-
dence and making its own findings on the disputed issue of liability86 be-
cause the opinion of a Virginia panel is not determinative of liability.87
The Virginia Act further protects against the danger that a jury will
give undue weight to a panel opinion by permitting either party to call
.. Ex Parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 309-10 (1920); Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d
1164, 1173 n.16; Morris v. Gross, 572 S.W.2d 902, 905 (Tenn. 1978); see text accompanying
notes 49-52 supra.
11 See VA. CODE § 8.01-581.8 (Supp. 1980) (providing panel opinion on issue of liability
admissible in evidence at subsequent trial).
" The constitutional right to trial by jury guarantees that all parties before the court
will have an impartial group of fact finders to hear and rule on the merits of their claims.
See Parker v. Children's Hosp., 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932, 941 (1978). Claimants may object
to the admissibility of a panel opinion on the grounds that it is based on evidence which
would be inadmissible in court under the rules of evidence, and that it would unduly
prejudice the jury in favor of the successful party since panel members are doctors, lawyers
and a judge. Parker v. Children's Hosp., 394 A.2d at 941-42.
At a hearing in Virginia, the parties may present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.
VA. CODE § 8.01-581.6.2 (Supp. 1980). Rules of evidence, however, do not apply in review
proceedings. Id. Consequently, a panel may hear and base its opinion upon evidence which
would be inadmissible in court, such as hearsay and the opinions of unqualified experts. See
Baldwin v. Knight, 569 S.W.2d 450, 452-53 (Tenn. 1978) (experts who testified before panel
may be called at trial and questioned regarding correctness of panel decision since admis-
sion of opinion in evidence does not substitute for expert testimony).
" State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis.2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434, 451-52 (1978).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court suggests that a jury be instructed that the panel's findings
are not binding upon them and that they may give the findings such weight as they choose.
Id. at 452; see Baldwin v. Knight, 569 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Tenn. 1978). Juries regularly hear
potentially prejudicial evidence, and courts are unwilling to assume that all such evidence
will affect their impartiality. Halpern v. Gozan, 85 Misc.2d 753, 381 N.Y.S.2d 744, 748-49
(1976); see text accompanying notes 30-34 supra.
e Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744, 748 (1977); Parker v. Children's
Hosp., 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932, 941-42 (1978). Case law suggests that the panel opinion
should be accorded the same weight given to expert testimony. Prendergast v. Nelson, 199
Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657, 665 (1977); Comiskey v. Arlen, 55 App.Div.2d 304, 390 N.Y.S.2d
122, 130 (1976); Baldwin v. Knight, 569 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Tenn. 1978); see text accompany-
ing notes 31 and 61 supra. But see note 84 supra.
87 VA. CODE § 8.01-581.8 (Supp. 1980).
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACT
any panel member, except the judge acting as chairman, as a witness.8 8
Since the Act does not limit the scope of a panel member's testimony at
trial, the parties apparently may question the witness as to the basis for
the panel's recommendation." Despite some risk that admission of the
panel opinion will influence the jury's verdict, public policy favoring pre-
trial settlement of medical malpractice claims is strong enough that a Vir-
ginia court has good reason to sustain the Act against a due process
challenge.90
Virginia's Medical Malpractice Act provides for pre-trial review of any
claim, at the request of claimant or health care provider, to promote out-
of-court settlement of malpractice claims and to clear court dockets of
frivolous lawsuits against hospitals and doctors.9 1 The Act is not suscepti-
ble to invalidation for violating the separation of powers principle since it
vests an administrative board only with the limited authority to make a
non-binding recommendation as to a. health care provider's liability.92
The Act singles out medical malpractice victims for special treatment,
and may operate to delay a claimant's access to court. However, since the
discriminatory classification is rationally related to the state's interest in
making health care available to the public at reasonable cost, the burden
imposed on claimants does not deprive them of equal protection of the
laws.9 3 Nor does the Act deny due process of law, since malpractice claim-
ants still have access to the courts and the opportunity for a full jury trial
on the merits of a claim."
No Virginia court has yet addressed the question whether the pre-trial
hearing established by the Medical Malpractice Act is constitutionally
sound. If and when that question does arise, there is both case law prece-
dent and sound reasoning upon which a court may rely to sustain the




89 See Abrams v. Brooklyn Hosp., 91 Misc.2d 380, 398 N.Y.S.2d 114, 116 (1977). Failure
to permit a comprehensive examination of panel members at trial may constitute a denial of
due prcess of law. Id.; Curtis v. Brookdale Hosp. Center, 62 App.Div.2d 749, 406 N.Y.S.2d
494, 495-97 (1978). On its face, the Virginia Act permits the party unsuccessful before the
panel to call a dissenting panel member as a witness and examine that witness as to the
reasons for his dissent See VA. CODE § 8.01-581.8 (Supp. 1980).
"0 See Halpern v. Gozan, 85 Misc.2d 753, 381 N.Y.S. 2d 744, 748-49 (1976); text accom-
panying note 47 supra.
91 See text accompanying notes 3-6 and 47 supra.
92 See text accompanying notes 28-34 supra.
93 See text accompanying notes 47-55 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 76-87 supra.
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